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Coates AND TROTSKY
In this two part essay the author, a post-graduate history 
student, discusses the historical m ethod  and theory of the 
eminent historian E. H . Carr in relation to the struggle 
between Stalin and Trotsky in the early years of the Soviet 
State.
H. C A R R  is best known for his History of Soviet Russia, the 
first three volumes of w hich have been published  by Penguin,  
bu t he has also w ritten  on the philosophy of history. In  1961 he 
gave the George M acaulay Trevelyan M em orial lectures a t Cam ­
bridge U niversity on the them e What is History? In  these lectures 
C arr placed great stress on the im portance of historical causation. 
Some historians and  philosophers consider causation of little im p o rt­
ance in  history. R . G. Collingwood, an  im p o rtan t philosopher of 
history, for instance, regards the essence of history to  be the thought 
th a t lies beh ind  events and  tha t to discuss this is sufficient to 
explain  w hat happened  in  history.1 H erbert Butterfield, Professor 
of H istory a t Cam bridge, has said th a t all an h isto rian  can do to 
explain  events is to  am plify the detail in  o rder to establish greater 
concreteness.2 O n the o ther hand, C arr asserts th a t causation is the 
very basis of history: “T h e  study of history is a study of causes.”3
In  this article there is an exam ination  of C arr’s m odel of 
historical causation and its relevance to  one of the central issues 
dealt w ith  in  his History of Soviet Russia: the factional struggle of 
1923-4, w hich m ight be referred to  in  a short-hand way as the 
Stalin-Trotsky struggle. T h is is a p o in t of some interest; it  lends 
itself to a consideration of C arr’s m ethodology, in  particu lar the 
degree of success he achieved in  p u ttin g  theory in to  practice in  a 
specific historical work. C arr’s p resen tation  of the causes of the 
in tra-party  struggle offers a suitable test of his ideas on historical 
causation.
C arr’s views may be expressed thus. H e attaches g reat im portance 
io causation in  history. M an’s actions are no t pre-determ ined; nor 
is anything and everything possible in  hum an  affairs. H um an  
actions have a cause or causes, b u t an  ind iv idual is m orally 
responsible for his or her personality. I t  is  the h isto rian ’s task 
to uncover the causes of w hat happened  in  the past. In  doing this 
the h istorian  works through exp lanation  hypotheses, b u t the final 
test of the validity  of a hypothesis is an  em pirical one. In  consid­
ering possible causes the h istorian  will consider a m ultip lic ity  of
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causes; he will, however, rank  them  in  some sort ot o rder ot im port­
ance. In  doing this he will be governed by an  end-in-view which 
will be largely influenced by the values he brings to the subject 
m atter under consideration. T h e  historian  will seek to reduce the 
com plexity of history to  order an d  he will seek to sim plify his 
explanation  — to fix on the m ajor cause. H istorians do not 
assume that events are inevitable, bu t they are principally  concerned 
w ith  explain ing why one particu la r course ra th e r  than  ano ther was 
taken. “A ccident” o r “chance”’ affect history bu t it  is the h istor­
ia n ’s task to exam ine the causal sequences ra tionally  and  pick out 
the  causes w hich provide a basis for fru itfu l generalisation and  for 
the draw ing of conclusions.
It can be said im m ediately th a t C arr’s practice does no t measure 
u p  completely to  his theoretical model. As G. R. E lton has 
observed, in  a ra th e r hostile treatm en t of Carr's views, C an  's history 
of Soviet Russia is largely a narrative one; it is difficult at times 
to  find the causal th read .4 T h e  party  crisis a t the end of 1923 in 
w hich Trotsky and the opposition  were defeated is no t dealt w ith 
separately and  at no tim e does C arr offer a full exp lanation  hypo­
thesis. Partly this arises from  the nature  of C arr’s history. It 
is a m am m oth enterprise, and  is at the one tim e a history of the 
R ussian revolution  and  its developm ent, a history of the Russian 
Com m unist Party, a history of Soviet Russia’s re la tions w ith the 
world and  a history of the in ternational com m unist movement. 
C arr him self admits, m ore th a n  once, th a t it has got ou t of hand, 
and  yet there is a ra tionale  for each topic w hich is included .5
C arr sees Russia a t the h ea rt of a world revolu tion  so he feels 
obliged to w rite a history of Soviet Russia in  this way. At the 
same tim e he has created difficult m ethodological problem s which 
he hasn’t solved successfully. In  order to grasp how C arr sees the
I actional struggle of 1923 it  is necessary to range over the three 
volumes of T h e  Bolshevik R evolu tion  1917-1923, T h e  Interregnum  
1923-24, and  Socialism in One Country  1924-1926, volum e I, and  it 
is only in  the la tte r volum e tha t there is w hat one feels is an 
adequate a ttem pt at an exp lanation  sketch of the political struggle 
inside Russia. Nevertheless, scattered through the o ther volumes 
there is quite  a deal of causal analysis in  which C arr offers an  exp lan­
ation  of events.
For the purpose of this article a tten tion  is m ainly on the 
situa tion  u p  to and  includ ing  the th irteen th  party  conference which 
began on January  16, 1924. C arr believes this to be the crucial 
tu rn in g  poin t and  holds th a t the  th irteen th  congress four m onths 
la ter only com pleted T ro tsky ’s rou t and confirm ed the bank­
ruptcy of his p latform  and the eclipse of his au tho rity  in  the party." 
T h e  struggle against trotskyism  continued  th ro u g h  1924 and  1925 
and  eventually Zinoviev and  Kamenev found themselves at odds
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w ith S talin  and  they jo ined the opposition; b u t the m ain  im plica­
tions of the political struggle, w hich by the end  of th e  decade 
engulfed B ukharin , Rykov and  Tom sky too, h ad  become apparen t 
by the end  of 1923. So it is on  the defeat of T rotsky and  the 
opposition  in  1923 th a t we m ust concentrate.7
C arr’s account suggests a great n u m b er of causes. For conven­
ience they can be divided in to  groups. T h ere  are causes which 
can be described as historical, th a t is, they arose from  the specific 
Russian m ilieu: such things as the backwardness of R ussian life 
and the peculiar social differences of R ussian society. A part 
from  num erous scattered references C arr brings these causes under 
notice in  two chapters of Socialism in One Country, Vol. 1: “T h e  
Legacy of H istory’’ and  “Class and  P arty ”. H e states th a t the 
R ussian historical p a tte rn  had  three im p o rtan t consequences: first, 
a chronically  am bivalent a ttitu d e  to  western Europe; secondly, 
developm ent rested on the conception of “revolution  from  above”; 
and  th ird ly , a p a tte rn  not of orderly developm ent, b u t of spasmodic 
advances by fits and  starts. These factors influenced the develop­
m ent of social ditferences. Russia was now  m ore sharply than  
ever divided between “a society” w hich solaced itself for the back­
wardness of Russian life in  the contem plation  of western ideas 
and  the enjoym ent of the trappings of civilisation, and the “d a rk ” 
mass of the R ussian people p lunged  in  the im m em orial Russian 
trad itio n  of poverty and  ignorance.8 T h e  hot-house-like developm ent 
of Russia, particu larly  its industry, p roduced  the industria l m an­
ager, who from  the first was “ the adm inistrator, the organiser, the 
b u reaucra t,” and  the greatest p rop o rtio n  of the new generation 
of industria l workers, who were still peasants in  factory clothes. 
T h e  small p roportion  of m ore urbanised  and  sophisticated workers 
was dispersed by the exigencies of revolu tion  and  civil war, and  the 
balance was fu rth er upset by the early period  of the New  Economic 
Policy (NEP) under w hich heavy industry, in  which the w orker’s 
outlook an d  status diverged most from  the peasant, was neglected. 
Above all, there was the huge peasant mass w hich gave its char­
acteristic qualities to  Russia. R ussian society h ad  a highly self- 
conscious intelligentsia, bu t it  had  no  counter-part to  the western 
m iddle class.u
C arr sees the difference between the “westerners” an d  “easterners” 
as a basis of deep division. T h e  M ensheviks were “westerners” and 
the Bolsheviks “easterners”. T h e  M ensheviks, includ ing  Trotsky, 
attacked the Bolsheviks as Slavophil m arxists. A fter 1917 the same 
division affected the Bolsheviks and  tended  to  be reflected in  the 
differing em phasis given to the claims of agriculture and  industry. 
A t the tim e of the “scissors crisis” in  1923, the m ajority  were eager 
to m a in ta in  the status quo  and  let the  fu tu re  wait; the revival of 
heavy industry  m ust be postponed u n til  m ore p ropitious times. B ut
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the m inority, soon to be the “opposition”, approached the  “scissors 
crisis’’ from  the standpo in t of industry. O n this view, the  prim ary 
cause of the crisis was the failure of the revival of industry  to  keep 
pace w ith the revival of agriculture, and  the rem edy could only be 
to  come to  the a id  of industry, and prim arily  of heavy industry 
as its essential base.10
C arr traces this elem ent in  the p rincipal characters. T rotsky 
was the most “w estern” of the  Bolshevik leaders an d  the least 
specifically Russian. H e  idealised western E urope; ‘above all the 
Russia against w hich T ro tsky  reacted was the peasant Russia of 
his youth. T h e  m atu re  T ro tsky  was wholly u rb a n ’.11 O n  the o ther 
hand  of all the  early Bolshevik leaders S talin was singular in  the 
absence of significant “w estern” influence. A lone am ong them  
he had  never lived in  western Europe, and he n e ither read  no r 
spoke any western language. T hose who stood closest to  him  — 
Molotov, M ikoyan, Kaganovich, Kirov, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev — 
were as innocent as him self of any western background. As a polar 
opposite of Trotsky, S talin, in  spite of being a G eorgian, was not 
merely non-western b u t d istinctly  “R ussian” in  the narrow er sense. 
N o t only was he the m ost “Russian” of the early leaders, b u t he 
was outstanding  in  his low ra ting  of the local nationalism s of the 
form er Russian E m pire and  he was one of the engineers of the 
forced bolshevisation of his native G eorgia.12
N ot at all unre la ted  to  the western-eastern question lay a cu ltural 
difference which C arr emphasises as an im p o rtan t causal factor in 
the split of 1923. Ever since 1917 T ro tsky  h ad  cham pioned the 
cause of the specialists. L enin  generally gave his support. T hey 
bo th  asserted tha t the use of ex-officers in  the R ed  Army and 
technical experts and m anagers in  industry  was inescapable. In  
spite of dem ands for w orkers’ control and  the p ro le tarian  d ic ta to r­
ship, the im portance of one-m an m anagem ent in  adm inistra tion  
was upheld. Lenin constantly deplored the lack of cu ltu re  in  the 
handling  of business affairs. However, in  1922, 65 p er cent of the 
m anaging personnel were officially classified as “w orkers” an d  35 
per cent as “non-w orkers” (only one in  seven of these being party  
members); a year la te r these proportions h ad  been alm ost exactly 
reversed, only 36 per cent being “workers” and  64 p er cent "non- 
workers” of whom  nearly one-half were now  party  m em bers.13 
T h is  was a result of N EP and  a policy of encouraging form er 
bourgeois m anagers and  specialists to  jo in  the party, i.e. to  become 
“R ed  m anagers” o r “R ed industrialists.”
In  A pril 1923 a t the tw elfth  party  congress, T ro tsky  presented 
th e  central com m ittee repo rt on industry and  un d erlin ed  the role 
of “the d irector w ho strives for profits.”14 Theorists were well 
represented in  the opposition  and  they inc luded  some of the best
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economic brains in  the party. Most of the im portan t early Bol­
sheviks an d  Mensheviks, w ith the exception of Stalin, and  perhaps 
Zinoviev, were pre-em inently intellectuals and they were uneasy 
about any course of action w hich could no t be justified by theore t­
ical argum ent; in  this respect T ro tsky  had  a rem arkable facility 
and  for sheer force of intellect could hard ly  be m atched. O n  the 
o ther hand , for S talin  doctrine was subsidiary to  strategy and 
tactics. T ra in ed  in  a G eorgian sem inary for the orthodox priest­
hood, he showed a m arked distrust of too im aginative an  approach 
to  m atters of policy.1"’
T h e  position of the w orking class in  this setting is a paradox. 
In  a negative sense, C arr sees “ the d isin tegration  of the working 
class” as a cause of the split. T h e  R ussian w orking class was a new 
w orking class, small in  relation  to the to ta l popu la tion  and  a fairly 
fragile social form ation. T h e  stress of revolu tion  an d  civil war 
dep leted  the w orking class dram atically. By 1921-2 it  had  fallen 
to half its 1913 num bers; and  the wastage was heaviest am ong 
skilled workers. By the end of 1920 Petrogracl and  Moscow had  
lost abou t ha lf the ir popu lation .16 N o t only d id  the pro le taria t 
decline in  num bers b u t it lost its d istinctive character. “In  1923 
heavy industry, before the w ar the  m ain  occupation of the skilled 
and  class-conscious worker, had  still scarcely risen above the record 
low levels of 1920 an d  1921.”17 T h e  opposition  urged the m ajority  
to rectify the neglect of heavy industry  w ithou t w hich an  advance 
to  socialism could no t occur, bu t they saw the problem  as one of 
economics —  resources, finance, p lanning, efficiency, m anagem ent. 
T hey  d id  not seek allies in  trade un io n  circles and  the workers’ 
opposition groups, who approached the problem  as one of em ploy­
m ent, wages and  trade un ion  influence in  m anagem ent. In  p ar­
ticu lar the trade unions suspected Trotsky, w ho was the one 
po ten tia l leader of an “in d ustria l” opposition, because of his record 
as the protagonist of the m ilitarisation  of labor u n d er war com­
m unism , and  as the cham pion of the  “sta tisation” of the trade unions. 
In  the heat of the trade un ion  controversy in  Decem ber 1920 he 
rallied  to  the defence of bureaucracy on the score of the low 
political and  cu ltu ra l level of the masses; and  there was a wide gull 
between his convictions as a centraliser and  a p lanner in  economic 
organisation and the quasi-syndicalist views of the “w orkers” 
groups. A t the tw elfth party  congress in  A pril 1923 T ro tsky  not 
only looked forw ard w ith  relative equanim ity  to increased unem ­
ploym ent resu lting  from  the ra tionalisa tion  of industry  and  the 
dismissal of red u n d an t workers, bu t condoned the continuous dow n­
w ard pressure on wages as a necessary con tribu tion  to “socialist 
accum ulation .”18 I t was because of T ro tsky ’s stand on these issues 
th a t S talin was able, a t the th irteen th  P arty  conference, to  stigmatise 
T ro tsky  as the  “patriarch  of the bureaucrats .”19
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T h e  backwardness of Russian life rested on  poor technological 
developm ent and  low econom ic achievement. In  this lay a general 
economic cause. A dded to  the general backwardness was the great 
cost to the economy of the abnorm ality  from  1917 to 1921. W ith  
the in troduction  of N EP in M arch 1921 econom ic policy became 
an issue a round  w hich opposition crystallised. Differences on  m any 
points — finance, trade, prices, em ploym ent, wages, m anagem ent 
etc. — tended to revolve a round  the state of heavy industry. A gri­
culture, ru ra l and artisan  industry, even the consum er goods indus­
tries, revived b u t cap ita l goods-producing industries rem ained  stag­
nant. O pposition party  criticism  of economic policy was concerned 
w ith  the adverse effects of N EP on heavy industry , and  sought first 
and  foremost to m itigate these effects through an  extension of state 
subsidies — if necessary by curtailing  the benefits w hich N EP had  
conferred on the peasant by increasing the burdens on him . Trotsky, 
in  the w inter of 1922-23, became the spokesm an of industry  in  the 
Politburo, where he m ore than  once pressed the dem and for a more 
generous credit policy. T h is  was the situation  in  which the so-called 
“scissors crisis” developed. C arr treats it as an  im m ediate cause 
of the in tra-party  struggle.20
At. the tw elfth party  Congress in  A pril 1923, in  the  course of 
his report on industry  fo r the central com m ittee, T ro tsky  produced 
a diagram  which had  the appearance of an  open pair of scissors. 
From  a po in t of parity  w ith  1913 prices in  Septem ber 1922, indus­
tria l prices and  agricu ltural prices had increasingly diverged u n til 
they reached, in  M arch 1923, 140 per cent of the 1913 prices for 
industria l prices while ag ricu ltural prices had  sunk to  80 per cent. 
T h is  situation  had  come about because of the  p rim ing  of the con­
sum er goods industries w ith commercial cred it and  the drive for 
profits by the industria l syndicates w ith  a resu ltan t rise in  prices. 
T h e  economic picture  was com plicated by a currency reform  which 
set out to replace depreciated  roubles w ith gold-backed chervonets. 
U nder the im pact of N EP unem ploym ent rose rap id ly  from  a half 
m illion  in  Septem ber 1922 to  a m illion  and  a q u a rte r a t the end 
of 1923.21 A lthough at first largely confined to “Soviet workers” 
(i.e. clerical workers or o ther workers dismissed from  Soviet in stitu ­
tions), and the unskilled  casual labor of semi-peasants, it  eventually 
spread to the  factory workers as unsaleable goods p iled  up . An 
add itional factor co n trib u tin g  to the econom ic and  social crisis of 
1923 was the uncerta in  real value of money wages w hich fluctuated  
due to currency m an ipu la tion . Associated w ith  this were defaults 
in  wage paym ent. T h e  to ta l effect was a wave of strikes in  the 
sum m er of 1923.22
T h e  p lann ing  controversy can be looked at as a cause of the split, 
e ither economic or po litical or a b it of both . I t  can be related  
im m ediately to the state of heavy industry and  the argum ent about
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finance for industry; more especially it involved the debate about 
the organisation of G osplan — the state p lann ing  commission. 
P lann ing  was considered part of socialism and  the Bolsheviks 
argued abou t its application to Russia. Various arrangem ents which 
were m ade had  im plications for the  developm ent of a p lanned  
economy. In  February  1921 the governm ent set up  Gosplan. In  
A ugust Trotsky, who had  been increasingly occupied w ith economic 
questions since the end of the civil war, pu t forw ard a p lan  for 
an autonom ous G osplan w ith large powers. A t first L enin  resisted 
Trotsky, especially his proposals th a t G osplan should have legis­
lative powers and  tha t a deputy  president of the council of com­
missars should become president of G osplan. T h e n  at the end of 
D ecem ber 1922, when Lenin was becom ing increasingly concerned 
abou t several problem s abou t which, w hile recuperating  from  ill­
ness, he h ad  had  second thoughts, he suggested m eeting T ro tsky’s 
proposals half way. However, T ro tsky  had  no o ther supporters in 
the P o litbu ro  and  the reform  of G osplan was shelved. A t the tw elfth 
P arty  congress in  A pril 1923 both  T ro tsky ’s report an d  the resolu­
tion  presented bore clear signs of an  uneasy truce on fundam ental 
issues of econom ic policy.23
1 R. C. Collingwood, The Idea o f H istory  (Oxford, 1962).
2 H. Butterfield, The W hig Interpretation o f H istory  (London, 1963), p. 72.
3 E. H . Carr, W hat is History? (London, 1961), p. 81.
4 C. R. E lton, T he Practice of H istory  (Sydney, 1967), pp. 13-14.
5 E. H . Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (London, 1958), vol. i, p. vi, 
vol. iii p a rt I, p.v. T h e  num bering  of the  volumes has got out of hand too.
6 E. H . Carr, T h e  Interregnum  1923-24 (London, 1960), p. 366.
7 T h e  P o litburo  elected 2 Ju n e  1924 after the  13th party  congress had seven 
m embers: Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Rykov, Tomsky and Bukarin; of 
this group, by December 1930, when Rykov was expelled from the Politburo, 
only Stalin rem ained. Leonard Shapiro, T h e  C om m unist Party of the Soviet 
Union  (London, 1962), pp. 606-7.
8 Carr, Socialism in One Country, vol i, p . l l .
9 Ib id , pp. 16-18.
10 Carr, T h e  In terregnum , 1923-1924, pp. 90-1.
11 Carr, Socialism in One Country, vol. i, pp. 143-4.
12 Ibid., pp. 179-80.
13 Carr, T h e  In terregnum , pp. 40-1.
14 Q uoted, ibid., p. 46.
15 Carr, Socialism in One Country, vol. i, pp . 146, 180-2.
16 Carr, T h e  Bolshevik R evolution , vol. ii, pp . 173-6.
17. Carr, Socialism in One Country, vol. i, p. 100.
18 Carr, T h e  Interregnum , pp. 59-84.
19. Ibid., p. 336.
20. Ibid., pp . 3-17.
21 Carr, T h e  In terregnum , pp. 47-8.
22 Ibid., pp. 68-78.
23 Carr, T he Bolshevik R evolution, vol. ii, pp. 370-80. Stalin appears to  have 
played little  p a r t in  this controversy except for a  letter he wrote to Lenin in  
M arch 1921 in  which he supported Lenin's a ttachm ent to GOELRO and called 
for "practical m en,” a “practical outlook” and a “practical start).” I. V. Stalin, 
IVorks, vol. 5, pp. 50-1.
66
